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Introduction.
The manner as it now exists in which the stock-
holders of a corporation may surrender their voting
power was practically unknown to the common law. Even
the mere giving of a proxy was regarded as creating a
scintilla of fraud as respecting other members of the
corporation.
At the present time nearly all the states
have passed statutes regulating the right of voting by
proxy. How far the modern custom irrespective of any
express authority,has altered the common law in regard
to voting by proxy is still a query,but it seems there
has been more or less a tendency in that direction.
Owing to the growth of the financial and com-
mercial condition of this country a new form of asso-
ciation has been devised,a significant movement in the
direction of the management of corporations which is
T R U STS.VO0T IN G
Ithe most prominent and vital feature of the pre sent
decade.
What previously throuCh t-. inconvenience of
apnearing in propria persona and voting at every election
is now arranged so that the vote of each member may be con-
centrated into the hands of a conmnittee or other third
party designated in the agreement,who may direct the casting
of such votes from time to time as they may see fit in
the best interests of all concerned.
FORMATION OF A VOTING TRUST.
In forming a trust of this character we are met
by a dilemma of not knowing a good definition- It
seems that the courts have hesitated in attempting to
frame definitions of trusts and voting trusts being
such a modern device text writers,it is believed,have
not found it necessary to frame a definition. Cook
on Stock and Stock-holders(sec.503)defines trusts as
follows: "The word 'trust' was first used to mean an
agreement between many stock-holders in many corporations
to place their stock in the hands of trustees and to re-
ceive therefore trust certificates from the trustees".
Mr. S. C. Dodd,the general solicitor and originator of
the Standard Oil Trustdefines a trust as "an arrange-
ment by which the stock-holders of the various corpor-
ations place their stock in the hands of certain trus-
tees and take in lieu thereof certificates showing each
share-holders equitable interest in the stock so held.
The result is two-fold. The stock-holder; thereby be-
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comes interested in all the corporations whose stock is
thus held. The trustees elect the directors of the
several corporations. From these definitions we may
deduce the following definition that the most cormnon and
ordinary voting trust is an arrangement by which the
stock of each stock-holder is placed in the hands of a
trustee separating therefrom the voting power and lodg-/
ing it under the control of a comittee whose policy will
therefore be to guide the trustees or board of directors
so that the corporate interests of all may be goverined
without each member voting.
One of the best illustrations of a voting
trust,and one which has been in successful operation for
a number of years,is the Wisconsin Central Voting Trust.
The main outline of the trust is as follows: A majority
of the rail roads known as the ',isconsin Central Asso-
ciation Line,were transferred to trustees who became
invested with the absolute legal title,receiving at the
same time from the stock-holders the perpetuAlright to
vote on the stock as its legal owner,with a discretion
to nominate their own successors subject to the approval
of the majority of the holders of the trust certificates.
The trust certificates that they issue are said to be a
personal contract between each certificate holderl and
the trustee and no other certificate holder be privy
to it. The only relation is between the trustees and
the cestui que trust and is limited to the single pur-
pose declared in the trust certificate. The shares
are transferable only upon the surrender of the certifi-
cates together with a conveyance in writing signed by
the certificate holder,or his attorney duly authorized,
and recorded in the trustee books,and every person acced-
ing any transfer must declare in so doing that he re-
ceives the shares subject to the trust. It is
intended that the beneficial interest in the stock,minus
the voting power,shall remain where it was before,that
the stock may be greatly enhanced by having the control
in a responsible board rather than in the individual
stock holders who vote with an eye to their own pecuni-
ary interest,and with no feeling of responsibility for
or to anyone else,and although the stock-holders sacri-
fice their voting power the advantage in the end is more
profitable to them,as the mere right to vote which,as
corporate elections usually go,is more often a burden
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than a benefit. Mr. C. F. Beach,Jr.,saysltthat the
only practicable voting trust,that is to say,the only
one yet devised that the courts and the politicians wvill
not undois one created by the absolute transfer of the
stock to the trustees in exchange for a trustees cer-
tificate in the nature of a declaration of tnist. This
may be perpetual or for a term. This trust as be-
tween each stock-holder and the trustees may be personal,
and there need be no other contract between trustees and
cestui que trust than that set forth in the trust cer-
tificate. Each stock-holder enters into the contract
for himself alone without reference to any other stock-
holder- If one such trust agreement is valid,twenty
thousand are equally so, Juch standing by itself and
being the voluntary deed of each stock-holder,for him-
self. The legal ownership of the stock by the trus-
tees after the issue of the trust certificateconsists
solely in the right to vote,the trust certificate re-
conveying to the share-owner all the beneficial inter-
est in the stock".
In treating of this subject,it falls naturally
into two branches; first, the effect of such trusts as
to persons or parties entering into them; second, the
relation of such trusts to public policy and,as to their
legality and probable future interpretation by the courts
and legislature.
Functions of the Trustees.
In treating of the office of the trustees we
should note that an arrangement by which the stock is
placed in the hands of a depositary with instructions to
vote it as directed by a conmnittee appointed by the
stock-holders and subject to their control,was held in an
Ohio case,that it did not appear that the owrnership of
the stock and its voting power was separated by the agree
ment,consequently the court regarded it as not creating
a voting trust but only a convenient way of voting by
proxy. Wie can readily speculate that under such cir-
ctmstances the officers would only be responsible to the
same degree as ordinary directors. But such an agree-
ment differs radically from an agreement whereby the
stock is placed in the hands of trustees who are invest-
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ed with the power of voting it as their interests may
dictate irrespective of the wishes or direct&ons of the
owners(a). Now the trustees to whom the stock is
thus entrusted,issue to the stock-holder from whom they
receive ittrust certificates which represent the pecu-
niary value of the stock,minus the voting power. The
trustees,says Mr. Beach,Jr-,"are then subject only to
the rules of equity which govern trusts. They should
be chosen because of their fitness for such a steward,and
should be absolutely beyond the influence of the certi-
ficate holders. They cannot elect themselves to of-
fice nor vote themselves remuneration. They ought to
have the power of appointing their successors possibly
with the assent of the certificate holders. They
would elect the board of directors which is all that the
stock-holders acting for themselves ever can do,and their
visitorial would amount to something,while that of the
stock-holders amounts to nothing. The trustees would
be responsible for good management and would be under
every motive which actuates men of honor to secure it".
The case of Smith vs Anderson(b) states fully
(a) Railway Co.fvs- State.49 Ohib St.,668.
(b) 15L.R.,247.
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the distinction between trustees and directors. The
distinction amounts to this,that the office of director
is one of delegated authority and that of trustee a per-
sonal office. A trustee acts as owner of the proper-
ty in his hands subject to the equitable obligations to
account to his cestui que trust,although there might not
be such a distinction between an ordinary director and
a trustee of a voting trust,still so great a confidence
being reposed in such a device should intensify the duty
on the part of the trustees to exercise the utmost good
faith in all deal ings in which they represent the stock-
holders.
Agreements of this kind are modern inventions,
and cases arising under them are novel in many of their
features and will probably call for the applic.tion of
equitable principles and doctrines such as are adapted
to work out justice and prevent wrong. An endeavor
will be made in the next chapter to treat the appli-
cation of these equitable principles as regards the
share-holders of the corporation.
10.
Effect of Voting Trust upon the Share-holders.
17ow let us consider the ler:al effect of the
voting trust as among the members and between the mem-
bers and the trustees. Will the courts regard such
a trust as creating a partnership as between the indi-
vidual members and the trustees or even as between the
members and each other who are not trustees? In
a partnership each member is agent of all the others
for all ordinary purposes in all acts done for the bene-
fit of the firm. It makes no difference in the legal
principle that he is in the minority on any question. His
power as a partner is not impaired thereby. But let
this same filn become incorporatedhis power to act for
the firm ceases,and as a member he can only cast a vote
towards the election of a board to whose hands all the
ordinary business of the firm is transferred. In a
voting trust one half of the stock plus one share can
elect the committee to control the boardand half the
stock minus one share gives no right either of control
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or voice in the board,consequently the entire control
for a term of years may be secured by one or more stock-
holders by simply securing the voting power of a major-
ity part of the stock. A very striking illusttation
of how a majority stockholder may secure the control of a
corporation may be seen in the case of Barnes vs Brown(a)
wherein it was held that an agreement made by one who is
president and largest stock-holder of a corporation with
those to whom he sells the stock that he will resign
as officer and director and procure other directors to
resign to make room for persons to be selected 'by such
purchaser of the stock,violates no rule of public policy
and is not void. The Court of Appeals in an opinion
by Earle,J., after adverting to the fact that pldntiff
held a majority of the stock and a right to control the
same,says: "It is the general rule sanctioned by the law
that those who have the largest interest in the corpor-
ation may control them as they have the greatest interest
that they shall be well managed. When Brown and
Seligman succeeded to the interest of the plaintiff hold-
ing a majority of the stock then issued, it was perfect-
ly proper that they should have the control of the cor-
(a) Barnes vs Brown,80 N.Y. 528.
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poration and it was not improper or illegal for the
plaintiff to surrender the control to them. There is
no proof that in obtaining the resignation of the plain-
tiff and other directors and in filing the vacancies any
fraud was intended upon the corporation,or that any of
the stock-holders objected to what was done in this res-
pect. It was simply the mode of transferring the
control,who by the policy of the law ought to have it,
and I am unable to see how any policy of the law was vio-
lated or wrong was thereby done to any one". It seems
therdought to be no reason why the holders of a majority
of tle stock of a corporation may not legally control the
company's business,make themselves its agents,and take
reasonable compensation for their servicesbut at the
same time their powers should be limited,that is to
say, in assuming the control they should also take upon
themselves the corelative duty of good faith and diligence
and should not unlawfully manipulate the company's busi-
ness in their own interests to the injury of the minor_-
ity stock-holders. The court held in Havemeyer vs.
Havemeyer(a) that an agreement between stock-holders of
(a) 43 Sup.Ct., J.& S. 506.
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a corporation who together own a majority of the capital
stock to unite for the purpose of electing directors is
not to conflict with the law or its policy. There
is nothing in it tending to frustrate with the legal
right of the majority of stock-holders to delegate to
directors of its own choice the management of the aff& rs
of the company. This case was followed by Griffith
vs. Jewett,et al.,(a) which laid down the doctrine that
seems to be the law at the present time,that an agreement
by which a stock-holder surrenders his voting power,may
be revoked at any time notwithstanding it is in terms
irrevocable. The language of Judge Peck in this
case is noteworthy: "We can perceive no reason why any
number of shareholders either by means of a proxy or by
vesting the legal title in another may not authorize
him to vote upon their stock and as suchl:i is the substance
of the case we consider it not illegal:so long as the
parties to it or their successors in interest are sa-
tisfied with it,no other person may complin,and the
irrevocable clause does not affect the rights of any
one. But if the equitable owner elects to withdraw
(a) Griffith vs. Jewett,15 Weekly L.Bulletin,422.
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the legal title from the holder thereof,the case assumes
a different aspect, As we have heretofore seen,it
is a dry trust; the trustees have no interest to set
up in its favor of continuancebut the parties have
agreed that the power to vote vested in the trustees
shall be irrevocable. Can this provision be sustain-
ed as against the damand of certificate holders that
they be permitted to revoke? If such demand be not
complied with the party holding the beneficial interest
in the stock cannot cast the vote thereof for it may be
voted upon by one having no interest in it or in the
company,and so it may come to pass that the ownership
of a majority of stock of the company may be- vested in
one set of persons and the control of the company irre-
vocably vested in others. It seems clear that such a
state of appears would be intolerable,and is not con-
templated by the law the universal policy of whch is
that the control of stock companies shall be and remain
with the owners of stock and cannot exist apart from
it. The owners of the trust certificate are in our
opinion the equitable owners of the shares of stock which
they represent and being such the incident right to vote
upon the stock naturally pertains to them. They may
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permit the trustees as holders of the legal title to
vote in their stead,but when they elect to exercise the
power themselves the law will not permit the trustees to
refuse it to them". In this case the court held the
agreement illegal in so far as it attempts to confer an
irrevocable right to vote upon the trustees. In the
case of Zinmerman vs. JTewett which was head with theA
case of Griffith vs. Jewett above cited,and involves the
same facts with the exception that the plaintiff sued as
owner of stock of the company which was not included in
the trust agreement,the court held that the attempted
irrevocable character of the arrangement be separable,
the arrangement was legal dg assenting stock-holders
did not object; and the power to revoke could only be
exercised by those who had assented. But we should
distinguish these cases from those where the object and
purposes of the trust is to work out some scheme which
is illegal in itself. One of the first cases in which
the validity of a voting trust which had been consti-
re-
tuted it aid of the organization,or to set an embarras-
sed company on itsf eet again in the interests of all
concerned,carne in question,was that of Hafer vs. Tjew
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York,Lake Erie and Western R.R.Co.,(a). A control-
ling interest in t,,e stock of the Cincinnati Hamburg
and Dayton R.R.Co.,another corporation,-ras bought up
in 1882,and placed in the name of H.J. Jewett, who was
then president of the 1Jew York,L.E.& W.R.R.Co.,under an
agreement that he should give an irrevocable proxy to
such persons as the Erie should appoint from time to
time to vote upon the stock, that his stock certificates
should be left in the hands of trustees; and that they
should issue to their respective owners of the stock
trust or pool certificates equal to their respective
interests~on all stock thus pooled,the Erie agreed to
grant a certain dividend.
After three Y'ears had passed,one,Hafer,who
owned stock not in the pool,brought an equitable action
claiming the pooling control to be illegal and void, and
asking that Jewett be enjoined from delivering any future
proxy to the Erie. The Erie filed a cross-bill demand
ing the proxy,or if the contract should be decided ille-
gal,that it be rescinded and Jewett enjoined against
voting on the stock at any time. The court,in an
(a) 14 Cin.Law Bul. 68.
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able opinion from which the following quotation is made,
sustained the motion for temporary injunction,and held
the trust contract illegal on two grounds; one,that it
put the control of the Ohio corporation in the hands of
the New York Corporation(the Erie),and the other,that
the stock-holders who united to make it,thereby villated
their duty to their fellow stock-holders. "Here a
large number of stock-holders for a valuable consider-
ation,have attempted to confer their right to vote upon
the directors oT another corporation. The law has
confided the care of the franchises and property of this
company to the stock-holders and it is the duty of each
xtock-holder- to vote for directors of the company with
an eye singly to its best interests"
In Guernsey vs. Cook(a),the court said that a
sale by a stock-holder of the power to vote upon -,his
shares,is illegal for very much the same reason that a
sale of his vote by a citizen at the polls or by a di-
rector of the corporation at a meeting of the board,is iI
legal. Each is a violation of duty in effect if not
in purpose a betrayal of trust"
Now,what are the principle rights of certifi-
(a) 120 Lass.501.
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cate holders? Holders of stock have the following
principal rights and privileges; they may participate
in the dividends of a company and on the winding up
thereof receive a proportinate share of the assets; they
may assign or sell their stock and,as is laid down in
Hkawes vs. Oakland(a),the right to sue where the direc-
tors of a corporation are guilty of fraud or breach of
trust,or are creating for their own interest,or where
the majority of the shareholders are o-npressively or
illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corpora-
tion which is in violation of the rights of other share-
holders,and which can only be restrained by a court of
equity. In other words the holders of trust certi-
ficates have the same rights and privileges as any or-
dinary share-holder with the exception of the right to
vote and it may be said that this power may be revoked
at any time by anyone of the certificate holders not-
withstanding it is in terms irrevocable.
One of the most recent cases which involves
these doctrines was decided in the court of Chancery
of New Jersey. The majority of the shares of the Up-
(a) 104 U.S. 457.
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per Deleware Transportation Co.,had been put under an
irrevocable power of attorney into the control of a
small stock-holder to vote on for five years for the pro
motion of the best interests of said company and to se-
cure the election of directors who should make and keep
one of the constituent stock-holders in the office of
manager' at a salary of J 25O0. during the five years,
provided he so long faithfully discharged his duty.
Some of the stock-holders revoked this power and an in-
junction was granted at their instance. Vice-Chan-
cellor Pitney in his opinion says: "the theory upon which
the capital of numerous persons is associated in various
proportions in the shape of a trading corporation to be
managed by a committee of the stock-holder is that such
co mittee shall truly represent and be subject to the
will of the majority in the interest of the stock-hold-
ers. The security of the small stock-holders is
found in the natural cd sposition of each stock-holder to
promote the best interest of all in order to promote his
individual interest. A member of an ordinary part-
nership has an additional security in the personal
character of each of his partners and may decline to be
20.
associated with any he does not know or apprDve. But a
stockholder in a corporation cannot control the personnel
of his associates and must rely upon their self interest
alone" It has been argued that such transactions are
executed illegal contracts, that the parties are in pari
dilecto and for that reason the courts will not inter-
fere(a). It is obvious however that this rule cannot
always be applied to plaintiffs for where public inter-
ests require that the relief should be given,it is given
to the public through that party(b). The mischiefs
felt or feared from these trusts may not alone effect
the interests of stock holders, but also imperil the
rights of creditors(e).
(a) Hooker v De Palo,28 0.$.251.
(b) 1 Por. Eq.
(c) Shirley vs Ferris, 3 P.7hns.77; i Pom.Eq. sec.433
21.
Rights of Creditors.
It is a general principle of law that the funds
of a corporation are held in trust for its creditors.
This is the only basis on which the creditor has a
right to interfere with the management of the corporate
affairs. If the corporate funds are being applied
to purposes beyond the scope of the corporate objects
in such a way as to incur the insolvency of the corpor-
ation and imperil the lien of creditors on its funds a
creditor can restrain the misapplication(a). It is ob-
vious however that all voting trusts are not formed to
imperil the solvency of the corporation but to guaranty
the control of the corporation to creditors who would
not otherwise extend their credit but for such control.
In Purgress vs Seligman(b) one Seligman,a creditor of the
corporation,received stock from it as collateral security
The law sanctioned his right to vote on it notwithstand-
ing the real ownership remained in the corporation.
(a) Conro vs Gray, 4 How.Pr.166.
(b) 107 U.S. 20.
22.
Here the pledgee has a power coupled with an interestf
the stockholder not objecting to such an agreement. Some
of the earlier trusts of this kind were designed like
that in Seligman's case to guarantee the control of the
corporation to creditors. On the reorganization of a
for eclosed railroad for instance,holders of bonds might
be willing to accept some similar security provided they
could have a controlling voice in the election of direc-
tors. The whole scheme of putting an embarrassed cor-
poration upon a solid basis may depend upon the consider-
ation for the temporary relinquishment of the stockhol-
der's vote in favor of the principal creditors. A
striking illustration of what I have just said was seen
when the Reading voting trust was formed. While the
y4eading Pailroad was under a position of great financial
embarrassment in 1887,such a voting trust was devised
under an agreement between the principal creditors and
stockholders. Their bonds and stock were put under
the control of the reconstruction board,with power to
adjust securities,reduce interest rates,create or ex-
change liens and transfer stock. The stock was to be
(a) Ervin vs P.& R.R.R.Co.,7 R.20 Corp.L.J.,87
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ultimately held by five representatives of the different
interests concerned and the majority of these dictated
the stock vote. They in turn issued trust certificates
to the original stockholders stating that they owned
the beneficial interest in the share which they had con-
tributed devoid of the right to vote.
Three years afterwards a holder of one of these
trust certificates applied for a temporary injunction to
prevent the execution of a voting trust at a ccming
meeting of the ccnpany and the case was fully argued on
both sides before the Court of Common Pleas at Philadel-
phia. Judge HTare in delivering the opinion while
resting the denial of an injunction primarily on the
ground that the case was not clear enough to warrant
such preliminary relief,discussed the question as to
the rights of creditors "we think that this view errs
in looking solely towards the stockholders. They are
not the only persons beneficially interested in the
railroad. The lien creditors are also owners and if
harmony-be -hot preserved may possess the whole. It iS
therefore necessary to have some arbiter to reconcile
interests which were jarring and might diverge,and the
24.
want was supplied by the voting trust. To decide that
the election must be held exclusively on behalf of the
holders of the stock certificates would frustrate rather
than give effect to the principle that the votes should
be cast by those who have an interest in the result. It
is not easy to discern how the position of the members
of a trust differs from that of an individual to whom
stock is transferred as security for a debt to a third
person. The only duty of such a holder is to keep the
certificate safely until the debtor pays or is in de-
faultand then hand it over to whichever partyis equit-
ably entitled. Had the duties of the Reconstruction
Board and 'roting Trust been confided to a single body
with the authority to secure the creditors by executing
mortgages and then hold the stock with the right to vote
in the best way calculated to promote the common good,
it could hardly have been said that there were no active
duties to uphold the trust or that it came to an end
when the mortgages were executed. If this would have
been the rule in the circumstances above supposed it
does not think vary the case that the end was sought to
be obtained through the close relating boards, one
supplementing and operating as a restraint upon the other
25.
Without pronouncing an opinion on a point which remains
open for consideration on the final hearing,it is enough
to say that the case is not sufficiently clear to war-
rant a preliminary injunction that will prevent an electon
on the day named in the charter and might cause irre-
parable injury if such remedies are given to them".
26.
Legality of a Voting Trust.
The legal theory of the relation between the state
and those who receive from it the corporate franchise
is said to rest on personal confidence. Thus when dis-
cretionary power of any kind is delegated to incorpora-
tors by the statute the law requires of them the personal
exercise of that discretion. It was said in Taylor
vs Griswold(a)the obligation and duty of incorporators
to attend in person and execute the trusts and franchise
reposed in or granted to them is implied in and forms a
part of every constitution of every charter when the con-
trary is not expressed. At the present time nearly
all the states have passed statutes authorising the
right to vote by proxy. Can the ourts of those states
now say that it is against the policy of the law that the
power to vote which is incident to the ownership of
stock,shall be separated from the true owner; in other
wordsdoes it amount to a breach of that personal con-
fidence which is given for the consideration of the
(a) 14 N.J.Law,322.
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corporate franchise? If we can consider that it is
not a breach of the corporate franchise then the trust
must defensible if formed for a legitimate purpose.
The law is clear that every kind of valuable property
both real and personal that can be assigned at law ad
may be the subject matter of a trust(a). The formation
of a trust for the carrying on of business under the
management of trustees is legal and allowable, bot~at
common lawr and under the statutes(b). In Gott vs Gar-
land(c)the chancellor said the revised statutes have
not attenpted to define the objects for which express
trusts of personal property may be created; such trusts
therefore may be created for any purpose not illegal(d).
It was decided in Vowell vs Thompson(e)that alledgor of
stock which stands on the books of the corporation in
the naie of the pledgee may by a suit of equity compel
a transfer to him or oblige the pledgee to give him a
proxy to vote. In a Pennsylvania case(f)the court
said: we think that the trust agreement is absolutely
void as contrary to public policy and because it sub-
(a) Perry on Trusts,667.
(b) 10 Vesey,llO.
(c) 7 Pae,521.
(d) 79 N.Y.602.
(e) 3 Cranch Cir.Ct. 428.
(f) 6 Pa.Co.Ct.,193.
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stantially amounts to a repeal of our act of assembly
in regard to the right to vote incident to the ou.nership
of stock. It is doubted in that court whether the trust
agreement would have been upheld anyway in the absence of
an act to the contrary,for the learned judge said that
the tr _ust not only gave the vote to the trustees but cast
upon them to control the organization and policy of the
said company, that it is common sense and common law
that the power or authority of the agent cannot be greater
than that of the principal. This case however was never
appealed for the parties agreed to a settlement between
themselves.
It is thought that it may be said with accuracy that
separating the voting power from the ownership for less
than a year is not by itself illegal or against public
policy and the courts when impeaching this agreement
usually find some breach of corelative duty which is it-
self against public policy either being opposed to the
relation of mutual trust and confidence which is deem-
ed by law to exist between the parties interested in
the corporation or void as an unlawful restraint up-
29.
on alienation(a) One of the leading cases involving
the question of public policy was decided by the Su-
perior Court of Conneticut in 1Sl, Starbuck vs M.ercan-
tile Trust Co(b). The majority of the shares of the
$hepaug,Litchfield and Northern Railroad Co.,had been
placed in a mercantile trust company in New York on a
five year voting trust and certificates had been issued
by the company. The plaintiff bought some of these
certificates with notice of course of the trust and then
notified the company that they revoked the trust so
far as their interests were concerned and demanded a
transfer of their stock. This being refused and an
election being soon to occur,suit was brought and judg-
ment rendered for an injunction, and a transfer of the
stock to the certificate holders according to their
respective interests. In the elaborate opinion by
Judge Robinson,the question now under consideration was
referred to as follows: "It is the policy of our law
that an untrarmielled power to vote shall be incident to
the ownership of stock, and a contract by which the real
(a) Fremont vs Stone,42 Barb.169; Fisher vs.
Bush,35 Hun,641.
(b) 60 Oonn.553.
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owner's power is handicapped by a provision therein,that
he shall vote just as mebody else dictates,is objec-
tionable. I think it is against the policy of the
law of the state for a stockholder to contract that his
stock shall be voted just as someone who has no bene-
f4icial interest or title in the stock directs saving to
him simply the title,the right to dividends and per-
haps the right to cast the vote directed,willing or
unwilling,whether it be for his interest or for the in-
terests of other stockholders or for the interest of the
corporation or otherwise. This I conceive to be aga inst
public policy whether the power so to vote be for five
years,or for all time. It is the policy of the law
of our state that ownership of stock shall control the
property and the management of the corporation,and this
cannot be accomplished and this good policy is defeated
if stockholders are permitted to srrender all their
discretion and will in the important matter of voting,and
suffer themselves to be mere passive instruments in the
hands of some agent who has no interest in the stock
equitable or legal. The learned judge also said that
this was not entirely for the protection of stockholders
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but to compel the compliance of duty which each stock-
holder owes his fellow stockholder. To a certain ex-
tent at least a stockholder stands in a fiduciary re-
lationship to his fellow stockholders. For these rea-
sons he held the trust agreement void as against public
policy.
In treating of the future interpretation of
what we may term the ordinary voting trust where full
control is left to the board, the writer is beset with
the difficulty that no case,it is believed,turning upon
this point has come in the reports of last resort,and
all that we can rely upon are the opinions which are re-
ported in the ordinary trial couit s. However, we
can readily see that if a case should aA se in New York
to test the legality of a voting trust which is formed
for the purpose of buying up stock in another corporation
and getting control of its management without authority
(a)
of law,or to create a partnership between two or more
corporations,the case would probably turn on the same
ground as the sugar refining case,that the object of such
a trust is illegal on the ground that the corporatiorib)
(4) People v North River Sugar Co.,121 N.Y.582.
(a) Penn.R.R.Co. v Conmonwealth,7 Atl.Rep.368.
Sumner v Masey,3 W.& M.105; Shepaugs Voting
Trust Cases,60 Conn.553.
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has exceeded its powers and that such excuse or abuse
threatens or harms the public welfare. A voting trust
formed for the purpose of running a single corporation
involves only the interests of the shareholders and
creditors. If the shareholders have agreed to the
voting trust and have acquiesced in the sane,\vhy should
they not be bound by the trust agreehnent,if otherwise
not fraudulent or against public policy. Now the
principles that have thus far been laid down by the
courts in which they seem to be in harmony,are as fol-
lows: first,a stockholder cannot irrevocably divest
himself of the power to vote on the stock and his agree-
ment to that end does not bind him. Second,a combination
among shareholders by which they transfer their votes to
a committee subject to the control of the shareholders
is not illegalper' se but amounts only to the giving of
so manly proxies. Third,a holder of stock,not in the
trust agreement,canot enjoin the trustees from voting
unless the object of the agreement is illegal. Fourth,
if the object is illegal,as for instance conferring the
voting power upon the trustees in order to get control of
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the stock of another corporation,the contract is illegal
and any stockholder may enjoin t.e execution thereof.
The present tendency of the American Govern-
ment seems to be towards greater care in guarding th.&
interests of the minorittes, This is noticeable by
the nuxnerous statutory provisions which are passed re-
gulating the right of voting and introducing the principle
of cumulative voting. It is just to allow the ma-
jority to x.le for they have the greatest interest in see
ing the corporation well managed. But it has happened
and it may happen under a voting trust,that after the
majority have obtained control,they might sell or assign
their stock and still at the same time retain their power
and be the minority in interest. Therefore the true rude
would seem to be that the majority in power must it seems
at least once a year be the majority in interest.

